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Is Big Data Enough? A Reflection
on the Changing Role of
Mathematics in Applications
Domenico Napoletani, Marco Panza, and Daniele C. Struppa
T
he advent of computers, and especially
high-performance computers, has had
a dramatic impact on the way in which
mathematics is done and even more
on how mathematics is applied, as
demonstrated by the growth of computational
mathematics as well as what goes under the name
of “experimental mathematics”, to which a journal
is now devoted. More importantly, computers are
now used to perform highly complex computations
in order to apply mathematical models to a variety
of empirical problems that could never be attacked
otherwise. It is in this way that mathematics is
often applied in different branches of biology
(think of genomics and proteomics) as well as to
social sciences and in what now goes under the
generic term of “big data”.
High-performance computing has also brought
changes in the way we think about mathematics:
its power, its methods, and the way in which it
can be used to solve problems. For this reason,
we would like to do something unusual in a
mathematical journal by bringing the mathematical
community into one of the discussions that are
taking place among philosophers of mathematics
and of science. While many mathematicians are
weary of asking broad methodological questions
because the danger of being vague and unclear
is all too real, we also think that we must have
this discussion concerning the modalities in which
mathematics is applied if we don’t want to be
trapped by our own assumptions and miss out on
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more fruitful approaches to understanding reality.
This is a discussion about the ways computational
mathematics has not only changed our approach
to science but even our way of understanding a
phenomenon.
We believe it is possible to identify four method-
ological motifs that are closely related to each
other and whose elucidation may make explicit
the approach to problem solving in data analy-
sis and statistical learning. By using short and
evocative labels, we could say that these motifs
concern, respectively, the microarray paradigm,
the preeminence of historical phenomena, the con-
ceptualization of developmental processes, and the
principle of forcing, which we have introduced and
partially expanded upon in [23], [24], [25], also
in response to some acute commentaries in [14],
[20]. Here we would like to simply focus on their
rationale and potential significance in clarifying
the underlying trends of quantitative, data-driven
science.
The first methodological motif, the microarray
paradigm, is derived by considerations that have
become quite important in modern molecular
biology. For example, DNA microarray technology
(see for example [2]) allows the scientist to capture
and visually represent, on an extremely large
array of microscopic sites, information on the
expression level of short strands of messenger
RNA (mRNA), extracted and amplified from a
given cell population. When the large amount of
data derived from DNA microarrays is coupled
with simple clustering techniques, it is often
sufficient not only to differentiate cell populations
from distinct tumors but also to determine the
outcome of a given therapy without the need for
an understanding, in each tumor population, of
the actual role of each of the mRNA strands whose
expression level is quantified by the microarrays.
Thus in [23] we have spoken of the microarray
paradigm to indicate how much modern data
analysis is supported by the belief that sufficiently
large data collected from a phenomenon will allow
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one to answer any question about the phenomenon
itself if treated with appropriate methods and as-
sisted by powerful enough algorithms. Significant
methods in statistical learning theory that embody
the microarray paradigm include clustering tech-
niques in their traditional hierarchical forms [31],
but especially in their more unstructured versions,
such as the affinity propagation method recently
introduced in [11]. This exploits a completely
local passage of information among data points
to obtain fast and accurate splitting into clusters,
whose best representative, the “exemplar”, is also
identified. Boosting [10] is another striking tech-
nique, perhaps the most transparent embodiment
of the microarray paradigm, where a large number
of classifiers, slightly better than random guesses,
are combined and boosted to build a new classifier
that is much more accurate than its components
(cf. [13, Chapter 10]). Finally, we mention here the
recent field of “nonlinear manifold learning”, a
collection of methods to find low-dimensional ob-
jects preserving some type of local, neighborhood
structure in unstructured, high-dimensional data
(see [30], [28] and [15, Chapter 16]).
As we can see from these examples, within the
microarray paradigm answers are found through a
process of automatic fitting of the data to models
that do not carry any structural understanding
beyond the actual solution of the problem itself.
This is a distinctive lack of knowledge that we
wanted to emphasize in [23] by speaking of
“agnostic science”. The overly optimistic belief in
the assumptions of the microarray paradigm was
popularized in a recent cover article in Scientific
American [32], where the author discusses how the
collection of unprecedented amounts of data could
allow the construction of a computing model to
predict the future, and even earlier in the opinion
piece of Chris Anderson in Wired magazine [1]
which envisioned a future of atheoretical, automatic
science.
Our objective in [23] was less concerned with
stating that such a paradigm has gained ground
or why this has happened than in uncovering
its structure, and the assumptions it depends
upon. Indeed, physicists often work and approach
their science from a very different point of view.
Regardless of how complex nature may be, there
is a belief that a fundamental explanation can be
found and that a theoretical, explicative model can
be reached. So, for example, Newtonian dynamics is
considered a fundamentally successful description
of the universe and an archetype of the way
science should look irrespective of the fact that
within its framework a solution of a basic question
such as the three-body problem is, effectively, not
computable. And yet these shortcomings have not
led physicists to abandon Newtonian dynamics:
within nonrelativistic velocities and as long as
the bodies we study are not too small, Newtonian
mechanics is still (rightly) considered a perfectly
good model of reality—indeed, one of the most
successful and enduring.
If it is not the lack of computability (as in the
three-body problem) or the lack of precision (as
happens for the relativistic effects that Newtonian
dynamics fails to account for or predict), then what
does require the agnostic approach embodied in
the microarray paradigm? We suggest that such
an approach is required when the phenomena we
want to deal with are historical in a sense that
needs some explanation: at least in an intuitive
sense, we call “historical” those phenomena whose
development can only be constrained locally (in
time and/or space) by (potentially multiple) opti-
mization processes acting on subsets of variables
and in such a way that the functions to be opti-
mized change over long periods of time. It appears
that many of the sciences which have been less
receptive to the classical process of mathemati-
zation concern this sort of phenomena. Biology,
economics, the social sciences in general—all are
examples of disciplines that study phenomena
whose development seems to be historical in the
sense suggested above. Our second broad method-
ological motif is thus the preeminence of historical
phenomena in contemporary science.
Fitness landscapes, introduced by Sewall Wright
in [34], best exemplify and motivate the definition
of historical phenomena: the evolution along such
landscapes is partially shaped by local optimiza-
tion constraints. But, crucially, these constraints,
change their nature dramatically over time so that
such evolution is not likely to be fully described
by any single global optimization process. The
selective pressure due to varying environmental
conditions on the genotypes of a given population
is an example where a local search for an optimal
phenotype is subject to constantly varying con-
straints. Recalling that alternate versions of the
same gene are called “alleles”, the basic idea of
fitness landscapes is to represent a population as
a point in a high-dimensional space determined by
its average allele frequencies and to represent the
average fitness of the population by the value of a
corresponding function. The graph of the function
generates a multidimensional surface (which is
just the fitness landscape), and the potential evo-
lution of the population is described by the local
maximization of the fitness on the graph. Note that
the landscape itself will slowly change when the
evolution of several competing populations (not
necessarily from the same species) is considered
at once, since the fitness of one of them will affect
the environment of the other (see [12] for a recent
overview of these issues).
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Coming back to the general definition of histori-
cal phenomena, we can assume that the time scale
at which there is a switching from one local opti-
mization process to another in the development
of such phenomena is much longer than the time
scale of the optimization processes themselves.
Again, fitness landscapes could provide a motiva-
tion for this assumption, since the environmental
conditions and the shape of the landscape change
slowly with respect to the change of the position
of the individual genotype points ([12, page 1613]).
Note also that not all variables are likely to be
subject to selective local optimization at the same
time.
Now it is possible—indeed it happens often—
that specific questions about a historical phenome-
non can be reduced to simple models that require
knowledge of only a few key measured quantities.
But the models intended to answer each individual
question are not only usually data driven but often
unable to answer other relevant questions on the
same phenomenon. And the methods exemplify-
ing the microarray paradigm that we mentioned
earlier certainly lead to temporary models that
have this characteristic. This inability to gain a
global understanding is not surprising if we think
about the randomness and relative independence
of the selective optimization processes that shape
individual characteristics of the current state of a
historical phenomenon.
It may be that a full, structured understanding
that potentially leads to answers for a wide
enough class of questions about a typical historical
phenomenon would require knowledge of its entire
history or the development of a proxy, a data-driven
model that is likely as complex, and opaque, as the
phenomenon itself, a perspective reminiscent of
incompressibility ideas in Kolmogorov complexity
[21] but in the context of a whole class of suitable
questions. The methodological danger is that
the flood of data generated by our innumerable
measuring devices may convince us that data
is enough; that there is nothing beyond the
microarray paradigm; and that opaque, enormous,
data-driven models are the privileged way to
approach phenomena, even though they become
so similar to the famous map of Borges [4], which
was useless, since it was as big as the geography it
was supposed to describe.
So the problem arises of how we can gain
meaningful understanding of historical phenomena
given the tremendous potential variability of
their developmental processes. Indeed, several
techniques in mathematical modeling already
show the usefulness of a partial historical modeling
of key variables, evolving in time, describing a
phenomenon; we think here of nonlinear time
series analysis methods [17], where modeling
of random and/or nonlinear processes includes
knowledge of its past states at several time points,
or of forecasting methods where ensembles of
initial conditions are used to best predict the
future state of complex systems, such as the
ensemble Kalman filter [16], [9], or the even less
structured particle filters method [19]. All these
methods show a distinct awareness of the relevance
of modeling incidental, historical developmental
processes. And we should not forget that many
successful heuristic methods for optimization are
directly inspired by the idea of fitness landscapes.
One example is the field of evolutionary algorithms
[8], modeling optimization of a function as a form
of reproduction of solutions, which allows tentative
solutions to the optimization problem to generate
new ones, through mutation and genetic crossover,
therefore allowing unexpected changes to their
fitness, seen as the evaluation of the function to
be optimized at the tentative solution. Another
example is particle swarm optimization [18], where
the search for optimal solutions to a problem is
seen as a collective process in which individual
tentative solutions are changed in time not only
by their tendency to improve their current fitness
(in the fitness landscape generated by the function
to be optimized) but also by their tendency to
retain close contact with the best-known tentative
solution.
Still, all these methods work more at the
operational level, where model classes have already
been chosen to solve a certain problem. They do
not constitute, taken individually, a coherent,
conceptual shift in the way to approach historical
phenomena and their complexity. We can try
to imagine more radical ways in which such
complexity can be tackled by looking at existing
attempts within biology to conceptualize rules
of development. In [22], for example, a general
“principle of biological inertia” is introduced to
give a broad conceptual basis to the multiform
expression of default dynamics in developmental
biology. Roughly stated, the principle asserts that
without external disturbances or internal (genetic)
control, there is a “local self-perpetuation of
cell-level dynamics” ([22, page 119]). Among the
many embodiments of this principle in the context
of embryo development, biological inertia would
correspond to stating that embryos have a tendency
to reproduce spatially the same basic structure
indefinitely. This embodiment of biological inertia
could be seen in the context of historical processes
as due to local optimization functions that try to
maximize replicates, or spatial distribution, of a
basic template. However, in a real system we cannot
expect this inertial behavior of developmental
systems to be indefinitely exact ([22, page 123]),
therefore the local optimization process will break
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down in the timeframe of full development, and a
complex, inhomogeneous organism may arise.
Note the subtle and unconventional use of
ideas from physics where only analogy is at work:
the principle of biological inertia parallels the
principle of inertia in mechanics but only at the
very general level of establishing the equivalent for
biological systems of a state of rest or dynamical
invariance. At the same time, what is essential
in the idea of physical inertia is retained, and its
usefulness is seen in the power of conceptualizing
the developmental process itself rather than in the
ability to identify and predict the final outcome
of the process. This logically rigorous and yet
informal use of ideas from mathematics and
physics to define principles that partially govern
biological processes might become the standard
for a proper structuring of historical sciences
exactly because individual historical phenomena
do not seem amenable to a compact explanation of
their structure and only the development that led
to their current state may be open to meaningful
theorization. This is a shift advocated by our third
methodological motif, the conceptualization of
developmental processes.
Indeed, the theory of evolution could be seen
as the archetypical example of this motif. Such
theory, in itself, is not mathematical and does
not allow quantitative predictions, but it has its
internal logical structure and provides a conceptual
scaffolding that has inspired biology and specific
mathematical models since its inception. As an
aside, we believe that our point of view is in line
with the recent commentary by Wilson [33], who
suggested that profound ideas in science need not
be mathematically profound; in this perspective,
mathematization is an overflow of the richness
and potential of an idea, not a condition of its
power.
What is crucial for historical sciences is that the
conceptualization of a developmental process may
not even lead to a structural, full understanding
of the state of the resulting phenomenon. The
phenomenon may forever remain hidden to our
understanding, and the microarray paradigm will
stand as the only way to find quantitative answers
to most problems we will pose about it. Concep-
tualization at best can provide the ground, the
language, on which to develop data-driven, agnostic
methods to solve problems. This acknowledgment
does not hinder, however, the tremendous poten-
tial of finding ways to use mathematical structures
to solve problems about historical phenomena.
To reflect on this potential, it may be useful to
change our focus. Up to now our discourse moved
from the microarray paradigm to an attempt to
characterize the types of phenomena that most
likely will require its application. But we could
also reverse this viewpoint, taking for granted the
applicability of the microarray paradigm (i.e., that
we have enough data) and trying to understand,
operationally, how to apply it.
One way to do that is of course to give free
rein to statistical learning, data-driven techniques.
But here we want to discuss a more general orga-
nizational motif: the principle of forcing,1 which
we introduced in [23]. In that paper we suggested
that several disparate techniques developed to
apply sophisticated mathematics to empirical prob-
lems can be brought together under a common
methodological viewpoint: the idea of forcing
mathematical ideas and methods on the data.
More precisely, by forcing we mean the application
to a problem of powerful techniques—such as
multiscale methods as applied to image processing
and numerical solutions of differential equations
[5], [6], continuity and functional data analysis as
applied to regularization and statistical analysis
[26], [27], or topological graph analysis as applied
to classification of molecular structures [3]. This
is not on the basis of a previous evaluation that
these techniques fit with the relevant phenomenon
because of its specific nature but rather on the
basis of a priori confidence in the power and
flexibility of these techniques [23] and using the
large amount of available measurements to adapt
the technique to the phenomenon. This is an
approach that contrasts with the usual idealization
process in modeling, where there is a progressive
stripping away of details from the phenomenon
to reach a simplified image of the same, which is
eventually amenable to analytical treatment by a
mathematical technique (whose usefulness is often
suggested by the idealization process itself).
The example of functional data analysis is
perhaps the simplest instance of forcing and the
most telling: a phenomenon may be discrete, and
yet, if there are enough data (microarray paradigm),
we can force regularization to be able to treat the
data as if they were continuous or even smooth
and therefore access the full machinery of analysis.
A more recent example of forcing, along the same
general trust of functional data analysis, is diffusion
geometry [7], [29]. The organizational principle
of this theory can be seen, at a very general
level, as the belief that, regardless of whether
the data available in the empirical problem are
categorical and/or discrete, it is useful to define a
notion of geometrical manifold associated to the
data, because in this way the whole apparatus of
functional analysis on manifolds can be adapted
1We named this principle “forcing” in [23] because this
term is strongly evocative of the general methodological
approaches it pertains to. It has, however, no significant
relation to the method introduced by Paul Cohen, now of
common use in set theory, that goes by the same name.
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and used to solve the problem itself. For example,
the review [7] describes how scientific journals can
be seen as points on a low-dimensional manifold,
built by first associating each article to a vector of
the frequencies of preselected words in the article
itself and then by projecting the cloud of points
associated to the whole set of articles onto the
directions of maximal variance. We refer to [23],
[7] and to the relevant primary literature [29] for
more details.
To be sure, forcing may be viewed as a coarse
and willful attempt to use mathematics for a
specific purpose, but are there limits to the
applicability of forcing? Is it plausible to think that,
for sufficiently large and diverse data sets, any
mathematical structure can be forced on them in a
computationally efficient way to solve problems?
While we do not have answers to these questions,
the weakening of the relation between individual
models and phenomena should make us think
differently about the role of mathematics in science.
We suggested above that historical phenomena
may not be amenable to uniform, structured
reduction to simple models and that in these
cases a data analysis approach to each problem
instance is most likely the best that can be expected
when approaching them, whether by forcing or
by standard statistical learning and classification
techniques. And these data-driven applications
of mathematics lead us to an intriguing version
of the famous question of Wigner about the
unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics: how
can classification methods, which are essentially
function fitting on data, be so successful at
predicting phenomena?
Our suggestion is that the four methodological
motifs we’ve highlighted may give us a context for
asking such questions and for a comprehensive
reflection on the ways modern data science is so
effective at problem solving. We are also encour-
aged by the interdependence of the motifs: the
notion of historical phenomena and the principle
of forcing seem pertinent only in the context of
large data sets and therefore are deeply dependent
on the microarray paradigm And defining his-
torical phenomena naturally shifts the emphasis
from phenomena’s states to the developmental
processes that generate them.
Surely science may have become agnostic, and
data analysis methods are often incapable of
providing understanding of phenomena—they
only give answers to our problems. But this does
not imply that its methods should not be amenable
to understanding. On the contrary, it is exactly
the absence of understanding of phenomena that
brings urgency to a widely shared methodological
and epistemological reflection of the scientific
community. Mathematics may not necessarily
work for historical sciences the way it did for
physics, but that does not mean that it has to
reduce itself to blind computations, and principles
such as biological inertia show that it is possible
to gain deep insight into the rules of this historical
development.
Therefore this is, in the end, an invitation to
mathematicians to approach biology and other
historical sciences on their own terms, a process
that frustrates superficial knowledge of each field
and challenges us, if we want to be relevant, not so
much to be interdisciplinary as to be scientifically
bilingual. We may discover that what is essential in
a field and the true linchpin of its conceptualization
is often very different from what we deem profound
or interesting in our own mathematical disciplines.
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